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The right to amend the Constitution in India lies with Parliament, when `meeting in the exercise of its constituent power`.
In the last quarter of a century, however, and in an atmosphere of judicial activism in the face of a faltering Parliament and administration, the Supreme Court has gone beyond its role as interpreter of the Constitution to become its arbiter.
There is thus a possibility in India`s federal structure of an impasse between the Supreme Court and Parliament which cannot be resolved by referring to the constitution and which poses a serious risk if not resolved.
Pran Chopra defines the problem and presents an overarching analysis.
He argues that a great deal is at stake in this situation, including the dynamics of federalism, which makes India possible; the role of the Constitution in holding the polity together; and the future of parilamentary democracy in India.
Written against this background, the essays in this volume—contributed by some of India`s best-known parliamentarians, jurists, constitutional experts, scholars, administrators and journalists—presents a many-sided discussion of this crucial issue.
The topics discussed include:
* The doctrine of `basic structure`, and the complex responses to and consequences of this doctrine.
* Judicial review in India, in relation to the superiority of Parliament in the UK and the virtually unlimited scope of judicial review enjoyed by the US Supreme Court.
* The `due process of law` and its applicability in India.
* The electoral system and the threat of majoritarianism.
* The Supreme Court`s creativity in interpreting the Constitution but the continuing absence of clear constitutional principles despite this recent trend.
* The Court`s role as the protector of Fundamental Rights.
Presented in the form of a debate to which each contributor brings his own particular expertise and point of view—and offers possible solutions—this very readable book constitutes the first full-length discussion of a major issue in contemporary India.
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