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Thirty per cent of foreign development aid is channeled through NGOs or community-based organizations to improve service delivery to the poor, build social capital, and establish democracy in developing nations. However, growing evidence suggests that aid often erodes, rather than promotes, cooperation within developing nations. This book presents a rare, micro-level account of the complex decision-making processes that bring individuals together to form collective-action platforms. It then examines why aid often breaks down the very institutions for collective action that it aims to promote.
Breakdown in Pakistan identifies concrete measures to check the erosion of cooperation in foreign aid scenarios. Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of international development aid, and therefore the empirical details presented are particularly relevant for policy. The book`s argument is equally applicable to a number of other developing countries, and has important implications for recent discussions within the field of economics.
Contents
List of Illustrations
Preface
1. Revisiting the Collective Action Dilemma
2. Intrinsic or Extrinsic Incentives: The Evolution of Cooperative Groups in Pakistan
3. Why Cooperate? Motives and Decisions of Initiators and Joiners in Other-Regarding Groups
4. Why Cooperate? Motives and Decisions of Initiators and Joiners in Self-Regarding Groups
5. Does Aid Break Down Cooperation?
6. Why Aid Breaks Down Cooperation
7. Fixing Incentives: The Way Forward
Glossary
Bibliography
Index
ISBN - 9789382993162
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Pages : 240
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